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Article 1

: Keynote Address

2015 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW
REVIEW SYMPOSIUM: RISKY BUSINESS: THE
ART OF REDUCING LITIGATION UNCERTAINTY
AND SETTLING CASES
Kenneth R. Feinberg*
Now, this is a topic worthy of a symposium. In the work I do, there
is a great deal of discussion about how the 9/11 fund, the GM
ignition switch fund, and the BP oil spill fund promote speed and
efficiency in establishing compensation schemes outside of the
traditional litigation system. 1 Very few commentators, very few
critics, very few lawyers or public policy experts focus on what I
think is extremely important to claimants who file a claim: the
certainty of compensation. When you file a lawsuit, you roll the dice.
You roll the dice in terms of outcome. You roll the dice in terms of
time. You roll the dice in terms of cost. But most of all, you roll the
dice in terms of uncertainty. You have heard it a million times.
Lawyers will tell clients nothing is certain. Yes, we may tell a client
that there is a ninety percent chance of success. But, nothing in the
civil litigation system is certain. And today, this program focuses on
prediction and minimizing risk. Very important.
One of the great advantages of what I do is that a policy maker or
the Congress sets up, by statute, an alternative to the civil justice
system. For example, Congress established the September 11th
Victim Compensation Fund thirteen days after 9/11. Anybody who
lost a loved one—on the planes, at the World Trade Center, at the
Pentagon—anybody who was physically injured was given a choice:
sue the World Trade Center, the government, the airlines, the Port
* This transcript is a reproduction of the Keynote Presentation lead by Kenneth R. Feinberg at the
2015 Georgia State University Law Review Symposium, February 27, 2015, The Carter Center, Atlanta,
Georgia.
1. Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-42, 115 Stat. 230
(2001); In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of Mexico, on April 20, 2010,
910 F. Supp. 2d 891, 903 (E.D. La. 2012); GEN. MOTORS, GM Ignition Compensation Claims
Resolution Facility FINAL PROTOCOL for Compensation of Certain Death and Physical Injury Claims
Pertaining to the GM Ignition Switch Recall, http://www.gmignitioncompensation.com/docs/
FINAL%20PROTOCOL%20June%2030%20%202014.pdf (last visited March 18, 2015).
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Authority, the security guard companies or, at your option, come into
a no-fault workers’ compensation-type fund. File your claim and
within sixty days you will be compensated if you are eligible. And
there’s the amount. If you do not like the amount, opt out. Go sue.
But if you like the amount, or if you are satisfied with the amount, or
if you accept the amount, release your lawsuit completely. No
lawsuit, here is the money. Taxpayer money! Well, ninety-seven
percent of all death claimants took the money. Certainty. “Mr.
Feinberg, I lost my son on the airplane.” Certainty. Liability is not an
issue. The only issue: how much money you are going to receive?
“Mr. Feinberg, as a result of the oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico by
BP, I could not fish and I lost a $100,000.” Submit your claim.
Certainty. No finger pointing as to liability. BP has agreed with the
President to front $20 billion to pay the claim. No risk. In sixty days
you will know whether you are eligible and how much money you
are going to receive. That is not risk. That is an insurance policy. If
you do not like it then go litigate. But if you like it sign “I will not
sue.” Well, in sixteen months, $6.5 billion went out and 222,000
individuals and businesses released their claims.
Nine months ago, GM ignition switch failure was alleged in
certain GM automobiles: Cobalts, Ions, Saturns, et cetera. Congress
said, “We and GM have decided we will minimize risk. We will set
up a no-fault compensation scheme independently designed and
administered by Mr. Feinberg. And in that scheme, if you lost a loved
one or were physically injured in an accident in one of these
automobiles, Mr. Feinberg will evaluate your claim.” GM’s liability?
Irrelevant. Contributory negligence of the driver—speeding, texting,
drinking—irrelevant. The bankruptcy bar imposed by the bankruptcy
court following GM’s bankruptcy? Irrelevant. File your claim and if
you are eligible—if you can demonstrate that the switch was the
proximate cause of the accident, without regard to contributory
negligence or GM’s liability—you will receive compensation within
sixty days. Minimum risk. And if you do not get the result you want,
either in terms of eligibility or amount, go file a lawsuit.
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Programs like I have been asked to design and administer try and
minimize the amount of “risky business.” Now, when policy makers
set up these programs, they are not really thinking about Georgia
State’s symposium and “risky business.” What they are thinking
about is the other two pillars of what I do—speed and efficiency.
They are focused on setting up a compensation system that is
voluntary. No one has to participate. Rather, setting up a system that
people will know quickly how much money they are going to
receive. And they will know this without the necessity of all of this
litigation cost. And that is why in 9/11, in BP, in GM, virtually
everybody comes into the program. It may be voluntary. Why not?
Why not come into this program? Why not get a free preview of what
you will receive for one of these Feinberg-administered programs? If
you do not like it, do not take it.
Everybody takes it, virtually. The money is very, very generous.
Because, do not forget, you are trying to voluntarily entice people to
enter into these programs. There is no mandate. You have to
convince them. Forgo a suit; take the compensation. Well, in order to
do that you have to have a pretty generous fund. You better have the
money. You better have the wherewithal to set up a program like this.
The average award for a death claim in the 9/11 fund was a little over
$2 million tax-free. The average award for a physical injury claim in
the 9/11 fund, a little over $400,000. Ninety-seven percent accepted
the money.
The other ninety-four people opted out and sued. They all settled
their cases five years later. Some may have received a little more.
Some may have received a little less. Five years of waiting and you
have to pay your lawyer twenty-five percent. BP, ninety-two percent
of the fishermen, oyster harvesters, ship boat captains, and hotels
accepted the money. In sixteen months, $6.5 billion paid out. Very
little “risky business.”
And now GM. Well, GM is ongoing. You cannot file a claim any
longer. The deadline was January 31st, 2015. Almost 4,500 claims.
We have paid so far I think fifty-eight deaths attributable to the
switch and maybe another 125 or 135 physical injuries. How many
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people have opted out of the program once they know how much
they were going to get? None. No one has opted out. Why would
they? Why would they opt out? You are going to go sue? That is
“risky business.”
First of all, the automobile accidents occurred years ago. If you
can get around the statute of limitations and the GM bankruptcy bar,
you have a chance. But the accidents occurred a long time ago. You
know most—not all—most of the drivers were young drivers and
most were drunk, speeding, fell asleep at the wheel, texting. So you
confront a contributory negligence barrier that does not exist in my
program. We are not interested in any of that. We are interested in
what the police reports say, what the maintenance records show, what
the photographs of the accident show in demonstrating proximate
cause. Just like it is a first-year tort law school exam.
So these programs minimize risk and promote certainty. They do
an end run around the subject matter of uncertainty. Now, if they do
an end run around litigation uncertainty by minimizing risk and
promoting certainty, why is there not more of this? Why do
companies and public policy makers—judges, Congress, governors,
mayors—not provide more of these alternatives to the traditional
conventional civil justice system? Well, there are some real
downsides to these programs. I must say, as somebody who for the
last thirty years has been involved in designing and administering
these programs, and not just these three—Boston Marathon; Virginia
Tech; Indiana State Fair; Aurora, Colorado; Newtown,
Connecticut—I have done a dozen of them. Now why do we not see
more of this? What are the public policy downsides? You have seen
it is not uncertainty. We are promoting certainty, efficiency, cost
effectiveness, and speed with these programs. So what is wrong with
these programs? Well there is a great deal wrong with them. A great
deal.
First, they single out for very special, certain treatment, only a
certain eligible group. Bad things happen to good people every day in
this country, and you do not have a 9/11 fund or a BP oil spill fund.
Instead, policymakers say, “If you lost a loved one on 9/11 we are
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going to give you money, certainty, and speed. Everybody else, fend
for yourself.” Well that is not America you see. That is not America.
That is elitism. That is the favored few. You should have read some
of the emails I received during my administration of the 9/11 fund.
“Dear Mr. Feinberg, my son died in Oklahoma City. Where is my
check?” “Dear Mr. Feinberg, I do not get it. My daughter died in the
basement of the World Trade Center in the original 1993 attacks
committed by the very same type of people. Where is my check?”
And it was not just terrorism. “Dear Mr. Feinberg, last year my wife
saved three little girls from drowning in the Mississippi River, and
then she drowned a heroine. Where is my check?”
You better be careful when you take taxpayer money and set up a
program for certain innocent victims. Everybody else, sorry, you go
the traditional route. That is why the 9/11 fund is a derelict on the
waters of the law. It stands alone. It will never be repeated. I think to
use taxpayer money to pay just some victims but not others is highly,
highly unlikely. Now, what do I think about the 9/11 fund? Great,
absolutely the right thing to do at the time. Exhibiting the best of our
American heritage, our character. From the perspective of the
American people, we will show the world we take care of our own. A
wonderful program. But do not ever do it again. Not that way. So that
is one problem. There is a political, philosophic problem with
creating special funds for special people and only those people.
Then there is a second problem. You promote certainty and
minimize risk by setting up these funds. And how do you do that? By
delegating unfettered discretion to one person. “Well, one way we
can promote certainty: let Feinberg do it with no appeals, no
committees, no checks and balances. Delegation run riot. Let him do
it. It will work.” Well it better work because there is no real due
process here in the sense of others promoting uncertainty by
providing appellate review, checks and balances, access to the courts,
access to a committee to review Feinberg’s determinations. No! We
do not want “risky business,” so delegate everything to Feinberg. The
lawyers howl about this, some of them. Some lawyers—trained at
Georgia State and elsewhere about the litigation system, the
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adversary system, due process, the civil justice system—some
lawyers howl when they see this. But some lawyers are constructive
critics exclaiming that all of this delegation to one person is not law.
They believe that these systems do not provide due process, and that
they are riding roughshod over due process in the interest of
promoting certainty.
Now, critics of these lawyers say “Sure, it is their fees that are at
stake.” I do not buy that. There may be some of that. Every case I
settle and get a release is one less lawsuit at forty, thirty, or twenty
percent for a fee. So there is some self-interest or self-motivation.
But I must say lawyers who have been trained in our litigation civil
justice system believe the way to achieve justice is to hire a lawyer,
and the judge and jury will decide. I must say when those lawyers
stand up and criticize what I do, many of them do so in good faith,
and I can understand that concern. That is a second reason why these
programs are relative aberrations.
I am asked all the time, “Mr. Feinberg, will you speak about your
GM, BP, 9/11 funds, as the wave of the future.” They are the wave of
nothing. They are aberrations. Maybe you will see another BP type
program, but that will require a company to front $20 billion before
there is even a finding of liability. But it takes a rare situation.
Unprecedented, to come up with that type of money to resolve claims
quickly, efficiently, with certainty.
Now remember we are not only talking about certainty from the
perspective of the victim. We are also talking about company
certainty. Companies want certainty. So certainty, avoiding “risky
business,” you have to look at that from the perspective today of both
claimant and company—or defendant or government—because
everybody involved in the civil justice system wants certainty. BP
made it very clear. Its stock price reflected it. Its public comments
reflected it. Its business plan reflected it. BP: “President Obama,
what we are worried about after the BP oil spill is uncertainty. We do
not want Exxon-Valdez2 for the next twenty-two years and counting.
2. Mr. Feinberg is referring to the Exxon-Valdez oil spill that resulted in 11 million gallons of oil
polluting Prince William Sound off the coast of Alaska. In re Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d 1215, 1223 (9th
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We want certainty. Our stock price wants certainty. Our shareholders
want certainty. Our board wants certainty. We will set up this
Feinberg-type alternative to promote certainty. Our stock price will
rise. Investors will see there is a plan. We are closing the circle. We
are resolving the claims. We will get this behind us and financially
we will move on.” GM: “Congress, we do not want a tarnished
reputation or open litigation wounds. We want certainty, no risk. We
will set up a program and in one year all of these cases will be gone.”
Certainty, without the necessity of prediction.
Understand that companies today and individual claimants are all
interested within the confines of the civil justice system to promote
certainty and avoid risk. So, it is all well and good. Today, I have
talked about these very creative offline, separate channels used by
BP, GM, and the 9/11 fund to promote certainty. What about
everybody else? Well, within the system—the civil justice system—
companies, individuals, and lawyers are all looking for ways to
promote certainty. Now what are some of the ways even within the
civil justice system? I observe. I experience it as a mediator. How
does certainty get promoted within the system? From what I have
observed as a mediator, you have to look at certainty today, and it
seems to me there are two ways.
One is substantively. What does decision tree analysis show? What
does the offer, demand, and acceptance of a specific claim show?,
What is the formula that you use to compensate eligible claimants?
How can we, in deciding who to pay and how much, how does that
promote certainty? What homework do we have to do? Substantively.
Look at our past inventory. See what we have settled and for how
much. What have we learned from those settlements? What have we
learned from those trials? How do we feed that substantive
information into the future to try and make the crystal ball less
murky? That is substantive, you see. You have to know exactly the
nature of the claim or claims to predict the result if you do not settle.
Cir. 2001). Exxon spent $2 billion in an effort to remove the oil from the water, and $300 million on
voluntary settlements prior to any judgments being entered against it. Id. Also, the State of Alaska and
the United States brought actions against Exxon for the injury to the environment, which were resolved
when Exxon agreed to pay at least $900 million to restore damages natural resources. Id.
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What factors go into that prediction? Valuation. That is all a
substantive discussion. Industry by industry, claim by claim.
Important, not only for the company, but very important for the
individual claimant represented by a lawyer who knows all about slip
and falls, medical malpractice, mass torts, et cetera. I know seventyfive percent of what I need to know because I have done it before.
Now I have got to predict the other twenty-five percent. Here are the
variables that go into it. Here are the variables that are irrelevant. I
am trying to minimize the uncertainty for my client.
Meanwhile, the company, substantively, is thinking about the very
same thing. “Look, this is the ninety-third medical malpractice case
we have received as an insurance company. We have settled or tried
ninety-two.” Based on that wealth of information, we minimize risk,
we predict, we know, and that is for litigations that are already in
place, that are time honored, that are well known, substantively. Now
another factor, in substance of course, is factoring into your analysis
of prediction and certainty, regulatory developments—very
important. What do the regulators say? What cases do they say are
ripe versus immature or unsupportable? How much of the regulatory
regime in our country is factored in? Especially by companies trying
to minimize litigation risk. The regulatory side as a mirror, as a
predictor of what might be in the future, now that is all substantive.
And the reason that panelists like John Childs are on this panel and
others like John, they have done it, they know. They know exactly
what I’m talking about. About factoring in the past in order to
minimize risk and predict the future. Now, it is all well and good to
say, “Yes, that prediction we may know maybe seventy-five, eightythree, ninety percent accurate.” Well that is good but, of course, for
some companies and individual claimants a ten percent risk is too
much. It is too much. It is a science. It is very sophisticated. But that
is all on the substantive side.
Now, the procedural side also influences certainty and
predictability. There are many companies in this country, contrary to
what you may think, that welcome aggregation, Rule 23,3
3. FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
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Multidistrict Litigation (MDL), any way to aggregate the claims in
one forum, so they can get them resolved. We do not want the risk of
the long tale—the future unknown. We want to consolidate now and
get the claims resolved; and not only the current claims if you want
to minimize risk. I will tell you in the civil justice system the best
way I think the best way for a company to minimize risk going
forward is Rule 23. We will shut down all of our current mass claims
and we will wipe out the tail of the future by giving people ninety
days, one hundred twenty days, to either opt out or they are in.
Aggregation. Aggregation as a procedural tool, for a company that
wants it, is designed first and foremost to minimize risk and promote
certainty.
If you go back and look at the class actions that have failed in this
country; many of them, maybe half, have failed because plaintiff
lawyers opposed them. We do not want that type of certainty; we do
not want to wrap this up. Asbestos is the best example—a nightmare.
Asbestos could have been resolved thirty years ago but the Supreme
Court said no by a vote of seven to two.4 Justice Stevens and Justice
Breyer got it right in their dissent. We better allow this class, because
if we do not allow aggregation as a way to promote certainty and
minimize risk, asbestos will remain pervasive and horrible litigation
for the next thirty years, and that is just what happened. So
aggregation, as a tool to promote procedural certainty—very
important. There are other innovative ways: local and regional
consolidation. Judge Weinstein did it years ago in Brooklyn, New
York.5 He successfully consolidated all of the asbestos cases in
Brooklyn and resolved them.
But even if you cannot aggregate cases, how do you promote
certainty and minimize “risky business”? You see companies with
“inventory settlements.” Insurance companies do this all the time.
Look, it is just another medical malpractice case. All we do in
4. Amchem Prod., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 591 (1997); Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S.
815, 815 (1999).
5. In re E. and S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 772 F.Supp. 1380, 1380 (E.D. N.Y. 1991); Loper v. EaglePicher Indus., Inc., Nos. CV–87–1383, CV–87–1384, CV–87–2273, 1990 WL 126474, at *1 (E.D. N.Y.
Aug. 13, 1990).
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medical malpractice cases, we know that the litigation system, if we
go forward, there’s a 91.3% chance that we will be found liable and
be forced to pay $500,000. We know it. There is nine percent
uncertainty, but we have a pretty good idea. So, quite apart from
Feinberg’s programs, and quite apart from ongoing litigation, we will
settle. And we will settle at a price where, based on our experience,
we know what it is worth. It has a value. These claims are very, very
mature. We know when they are filed what they are worth. All we
need, to promote the type of certainty we need as businessmen—
ABC—the plaintiff lawyers also know. “Mrs. Jones you were hit by
an automobile. Now I have thirty-four automobile cases like yours. I
know what Chubb will pay. I know what Liberty Mutual will pay.”
Workers’ compensation—in fifty states—is based on minimizing
uncertainty. You lose an eye on the job, you get $3,200 a month.
That is it. Why $3,200? “We’ve gauged these every year. We know
what a lost eye is worth.” Well you can fight about that, but that is
different. “$3,200 ought to be $6,800.” That is a substantive issue. I
am talking about how, claimants and businesses alike, do not like
“risky business.” They do not like it. It is bad for business; it is bad
for the claimant. We want the same type of certainty that Feinberg
provides to these companies through these programs like GM and
BP. It is the same type. That is what we want. And what you are
going to hear today are some variations on this discussion. What is
the endgame? Promoting certainty. Everybody wants it. No one
wants to roll the dice. How do you promote certainty and minimize
risk? I know of no program quite like this symposium where you will
talk about, even as an existential matter, certainty and minimizing
risk. That is what it is all about you see.
QUESTION & ANSWER SESSION
Q: Do these alternative systems undermine the precautions big
corporations might take for safety by having this be able to resolve
issues that come up later? Are they taking all the stuff they can to
make the situations as safe?
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A: Well you are saying, “Does the tort system deter and if you can
go to an optional alternative system—BP, GM—does that undermine
safety?” I do not think it undermines safety. We will see I guess. I
think GM and BP, for all of their effort in setting up these alternative
systems, there is plenty of other litigation to deter. If there is anything
I have learned in this country, in this litigation system, it probably
over deters and in these types of cases where BP sets up an
alternative program or GM sets up an alternative program, they still
confront thousands of other cases involving thousands of other
automobiles or oil spills and I do not think that these programs in and
of themselves prevent deterrence. These programs are very expensive
by the way; I mean BP did pay $6.5 billion. Billion! So I do not think
that the deterrence argument sits well. Especially in conjunction with
the regulators who, after a spill and after automobile accidents,
suddenly, are on their white horse with regulatory aggressiveness. So
I think between that, I would think danger is not enhanced.
Q: Is there any data or estimate about the premium that BP or GM
paid for certainty as compared to no funds and having to deal with
lawsuits?
A: Far from a premium, I think, BP and GM calculated that it is
cheaper to go this route. Not to pay law firms and not to litigate for
twenty-two years or ten years or eight years and roll the dice with
punitive damages and all of that risk. I think they have concluded, as
a dollars and cents matter, our stock price and our investors would
rather have us cabinize the problem and get rid of it quickly, rather
than run into “risky business.” And I think, far from paying a
premium, they see this as a very cost effective way to satisfy
claimants and at the same time move on without uncertainty hovering
over their shoulder.
Q: I read recently in the newspaper that BP had appealed all the
way to the Supreme Court, basically saying they made a bad deal and
the court should let them out of it?
A: That is right. After I left, I might add. After I departed in March
of 2012, BP decided that they would settle all other private claims
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pursuant to Rule 23.6 And they proceeded to sign a 1,000-page
settlement agreement with the plaintiff lawyers. Well, after that they
became disenchanted with that settlement, with the administration of
that settlement, and they are now litigating in New Orleans. But I
read the newspapers like you do. I am long gone from that. Thank
goodness.
Q: You indicated that in administering the funds for GM you did
not look at contributory negligence, but rather you focused on
proximate cause. How do you make that distinction? Because if a
young driver is drunk, does that not lead into proximate cause?
A: Well what we do is we isolate the young drivers drinking and
speeding and we want to look at the mechanical problem. I mean
somebody may be drunk and still it may be an ignition switch that is
defective. We said the following: “We are not interested in anything
other than the link; the causal connection between the switch and the
accident.” If somebody is drinking or going ninety miles an hour we
are not interested in that. We want to focus on the mechanical
mistake. So here is what we look at to determine proximate cause.
First, we look at the police report. If the police report says “air bags
did not deploy,” well if the air bags did not deploy and it is a front
end collision with a car that hit a tree going fifty miles per hour, the
power is off or the airbags would have deployed. If the power is off,
why is the power off? It might be the switch.
Second, we look at the contemporaneous photos of the accident
itself. If the airbag didn’t deploy, maybe it’s a rear end collision and
the photos will show it and the air bags should not have deployed—if
it is a rear end collision or a side collision. Air bag non-deployment is
critical, but we got to look at the photos because there might be other
reasons the air bag did not deploy.
Third, we look at what the maintenance records show. Now the
maintenance records before the accident will not usually mention a
defective switch, but they may mention non-power problems.
6. Campbell Robertson & John Schwartz, How a Gulf Settlement That BP Once Hailed Became Its
Target, N.Y. TIMES (April 26, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/27/us/how-a-gulf-settlementthat-bp-once-hailed-became-its-target.html?_r=0.
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“Maintenance guy, my car keeps stalling going fifty miles per hour,
all of a sudden it shuts off. I pull over, but the antilock brakes do not
work, the power steering is not functioning, and the car is stalling. I
do not get it.” We look at that circumstantial evidence, then of course
if you have direct evidence—the black box, the computer in the
engine, that is great, that will tell you within a tenth of a second
whether the power was off prior to the accident. So you look at all of
that and then you say, this is circumstantial evidence of proximate
cause. Ignore the kid speeding. GM found thirteen deaths based on
direct evidence, they looked at the car; and we are already at fiftyeight deaths based on proximate cause—a much more lenient
standard than direct evidence. So it works.
Q: Are you suggesting that a worker’s compensation kind of
system would be appropriate for any type of tort claim or are there
some kinds of tort claims that necessarily do not lend themselves to a
worker’s compensation system?
A: That is a policy issue. First of all understand, I am not the
person, ever, that decides to create these programs. Governors,
Congress, presidents, attorneys general, judges, they come to me and
say, we have decided we want to create this program. Now you
design it and administer it. I cannot answer the question, “Are there
certain types of mass catastrophes where a workers compensation
type model would not work?” I do not know. I tend to think that the
answer to that is rather provocative. Well, they can work in any one
of those situations.
Now the criteria might be different, the procedures might be
different, the proof requirements might be different, but I would tend
to think that that in at least in a mass claims situation, thousands of
claims, a worker’s compensation type alternative can work. I say type
because the money certainly is not at worker’s compensation levels
in these programs. If you are going to waive your right to sue you
better pay people a commensurate amount that will be adequate
consideration for them not to litigate. So you are talking about a nonworker’s compensation damages model as to amount. I think they
could work just about anywhere if you really wanted to set it up. The
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trouble with setting these up more frequently is everybody else does
not benefit. There is a certain degree of unfairness. I received claims
during BP, “Mr. Feinberg, I could not fish in Alaska, Exxon Valdez,
where’s my check?” Well go ask Exxon. That does not get you very
far with that claimant. He is not happy to hear that. Go ask Exxon. I
have no jurisdiction over Exxon. So that is the problem, not the
design difficulty, I do not think. I think these templates work.
Q: The law is always evolving. What kind of consequences do you
think there are, taking all these settlements out of the courts where
there is potential for the law to evolve—new issues, understandings
to come about—versus we just have a settlement?
A: There is virtually no chance that in this country we would
encourage a comprehensive resolution of cases like this out of the
civil justice system. And there are a couple of reasons for that. First
of all, the people in this room I think, including the questioner,
understand the civil justice system is so engrained in the history of
this country. The idea that there would be some 9/11 or BP or GM
model to replace the adversary system is tilting at windmills. The
civil justice system, unlike any other litigation system in any other
country, the system is part and parcel of our country’s history. It is
engrained in the heritage of the country. It has always been there.
And it will always be there. Secondly, even if you came up with a
master alternative, good luck. The politics of the country is so
antithetical to any type of major change in the way that we resolve
disputes, I think that you would be tilting at windmills to think you
could get very far politically with it. So I think it takes a type of
disaster—like 9/11—where policymakers emotionally say “oh my
goodness we need an alternative.” But, if Congress had waited two
more weeks I do not think there would have been a 9/11 fund, at least
not the way they drafted it. So I do not think it is realistic. I think we
are absolutely right in this Symposium to focus on how to minimize
risk or predict the future within the context of the civil justice system,
not with the types of programs I administer.
Q: In these programs, certainty is great if you are economically
rational, but as we know people are not economically rational. Can
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you comment on how these programs, in any way, either defeat or
somehow help satisfy the need of the individuals to essentially be
heard?
A: I tell everybody that comes into these programs the statistics.
Why? It is not just the money. It is not just financial generosity. You
will hear from Professor Galanter and others on this, about the
vanishing trial. If you go to court, you do not get heard. You do not
get an opportunity to vent. In every one of my programs, GM is a
good example, anybody who wants to come and see me, to talk about
their claim and confront the face of the program, I will permit it. And
if there are too many of you, I will designate a deputy to see you oneon-one, in confidence. It works.
Giving people the opportunity to be heard is essential to success
and very few people come to see me to talk about money. They come
for two reasons. One, to vent about life’s unfairness, “Mr. Feinberg, I
lost my nineteen year old son driving a GM car. Why? Life is unfair.
There is no God that would take my son from me.” And you just
listen. They want to vent. Why are they the victims of a curveball?
Why them? And they go on and on and vent. Just listen. Or, they
come to validate the memory of a lost loved one. It is unbelievable.
“Mr. Feinberg, I lost my husband. We were married for twenty five
years. He was a fireman and he died in the World Trade Center, and I
am at this hearing and I want to show you a video of our wedding
twenty five years ago.”
“Well, Mrs. Jones, you don’t have to show me that video, it won’t
have any bearing on compensation and it will be very emotional.”
“You are going to watch! I want you to see what those murderers did
to my husband. What a great man. Look how great he looks at the
wedding.”
That necessity—people are not always financially and
economically rational—of giving people the opportunity to be heard
is important. Now many people do not want that opportunity; people
grieve in many different ways. Some people grieve in private; they
do not want to see you, they send in the forms, and are not interested.
But some people want to come and see me and they want to validate,
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and they want to vent and by giving them that opportunity,
overwhelmingly that helps them get over the hurdle and take the
money. And it is a critically important part of this.
I am honored to be invited. I cannot think of a symposium that is
more timely. I wanted to thank everybody, particularly the law school
and particularly the law review. So thank you all very much.
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